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The UK Government’s Command Paper released on 21 July 2021 urges a
renegotiation of the Protocol on Ireland/Northern Ireland, which forms part of the EU-
UK Withdrawal Agreement (WA). The EU has already indicated that a renegotiation
is out of the question. In fact, this blog post argues that it would be constitutionally
impossible for the EU to agree to the UK’s proposals without agreeing to a radical
revision of the Protocol that would endanger the achievement of its overall aims.
In addition, the invocation of Article 16 (the safeguards clause) as discussed in
the Command Paper would not resolve the underlying issues either and the UK
Government knows this. But that leaves the question: What is the Command Paper
really about?
What does the Command Paper say?
The aim of the Protocol is to keep the land border between Ireland and Northern
Ireland open for people and goods avoiding any physical border infrastructure. The
Protocol achieves this by requiring the application of the EU customs code and of EU
product standards in Northern Ireland. While Northern Ireland formally remains part
of the UK customs territory and of the UK regulatory space, this means in practice
that for most goods entering Northern Ireland from Great Britain there is a customs
and regulatory border in the Irish Sea. This has led to well-documented grievances,
notably on part of the unionist community in Northern Ireland, with a recent poll
suggesting that the population of Northern Ireland is evenly split on the question
whether the Protocol is appropriate for managing Brexit.
The Command Paper commences by recounting the history of the Protocol
negotiations followed by an expression of the UK Government’s discontent with it,
which constitutes the basis of the Government’s case for its fundamental revision.
The Government then discusses the possible invocation of Article 16 of the Protocol
(on this later) before making a number of concrete suggestions for revision. These
include changes to the customs regime, the rules on sanitary and phytosanitary
measures, VAT, and state aid. Many of these proposals constitute a re-hash of
earlier UK proposals, which had been knocked back by the EU on various occasions.
There is already a good bit of commentary on the trade aspects of the Command
Paper (e.g. the twitter threads by Anna Jerzewska and Sam Lowe).
This blog post focuses on the much more radical proposals concerning the
governance of the Protocol.
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Governance issues
The Command Paper identifies Articles 12 (4) to (7) of the Protocol as its ‘most
unusual feature’ as it provides for Union law-based enforcement of the goods
trade-related provisions contained in the Protocol. In particular, it gives the EU
Commission powers of enforcement according to Article 258 TFEU and it gives the
UK courts the rights – and in some cases even puts them under a duty – to refer
questions of interpretation of EU law made applicable by the Protocol to the Court of
Justice according to Article 267 TFEU.
The Command Paper proposes to replace this EU law-based enforcement with
the type of enforcement found in the Trade and Cooperation Agreement (i.e. the
future relationship agreement, TCA) between the EU and the UK. According to the
Command Paper, this would mean that ‘governance and disputes are managed
collectively and ultimately through international arbitration’.
This passage raises more questions than it answers. The main reason for the
ECJ’s jurisdiction over the trade-related aspects of the Protocol is that the Protocol
stipulates that EU law is the law generally applicable to govern movements of goods
into Northern Ireland. The same is true for state-aid, VAT and the single electricity
market on the island of Ireland. The Court of Justice has exclusive jurisdiction
to interpret EU law so far as it has effects within the EU legal order. Otherwise
the autonomy of the EU legal order would be undermined. This has long been
established in the ECJ’s external relations case law, starting with Opinion 1/91 and
since confirmed e.g. in the Mox Plant case, Opinion 2/13 and Achmea. This means
that so long as the Protocol refers to EU law – and it does so extensively – the Court
of Justice must have the final word on its interpretation.
This leaves two possible readings of the UK Government’s proposal in relation to
Governance.
The first, more benign reading would see dispute settlement aligned to that in the
WA (and not the TCA), i.e. it would be confined to inter-party dispute settlement
between the EU and the UK, which would primarily be diplomatic and take place in
the Joint Committee. Only if the Joint Committee cannot reach a resolution, could
one of the parties start arbitration proceedings. In order to preserve the autonomy of
EU law, however, the arbitral tribunal would be under an obligation to refer matters of
interpretation to the ECJ. This is essentially the kind of dispute settlement provided
for in the WA – see Article 174 WA. It is not that contained in the TCA, which does
not envisage references to the ECJ, simply because it does not make EU law
applicable. While this reading would be compatible with the constraints of EU law, it
would seriously weaken the enforceability of the Protocol. Depending on the fate of
direct effect (see below) private enforcement could become impossible and public
enforcement would become predominantly political rather than legal.
The second, less benign, but literal, reading would necessitate a much more radical
revision of the Protocol. Given the constitutional constraints that the exclusive
jurisdiction of the Court of Justice places on the EU, the only way to avoid it having
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any jurisdiction would be to remove all references to EU law from the Protocol
and replace them with sui generis rules, which an arbitral tribunal could then
interpret freely. Again, one would end up with weak enforcement, but what is more
problematic is that this solution would put at risk the entire foundation of the Protocol.
The Protocol manages to keep the border free from any physical infrastructure
precisely because EU law is applied to goods entering Northern Ireland so that they
can then move freely to the single market. If the rules governing entry to Northern
Ireland were to be replaced by sui generis rules – even if those replicated EU law
as it stands today – at least over time there will be divergence through changes in
customs tariffs, product standards, etc, and the Protocol would cease to achieve its
main goal.
Both readings raise the further question of the direct effect of the Protocol, which is
something the Command Paper does not address. According to Article 4 WA, the
provisions in the Protocol – like the entire WA – are capable of having direct effect
and thus of being enforced in the domestic courts of the UK and the EU. If the UK
Government’s aim is to align dispute settlement under the Protocol to that found in
the TCA, then this would require the parties to adapt the direct effect clause in the
WA. Otherwise, private enforcement would remain possible. Depending on how this
is done, this could have far-reaching consequences beyond questions of trade. A
radical abolition of Article 4 WA would for instance endanger the enforceability of the
citizens’ rights part of the WA. A more limited adaptation that would only affect the
Protocol might turn out to be too widely phrased as well and affect its Article 2, which
enshrines the individual rights guaranteed in the Good Friday/Belfast Agreement.
The Command Paper does not address these important consequences.
This discussion shows that the proposals for governance reform are non-starters
from an EU perspective. It is therefore hardly surprising that the proposals to
renegotiate the protocol were given short shrift by the EU Commission only a few
hours after the Command Paper had been published.
What next?
How might the UK react to the Commission’s refusal? The Command Paper
discusses the application of the safeguards clause in Article 16 of the Protocol, but
considers its exercise ‘undesirable for the time being’. The clause allows one of
the parties to adopt safeguard measures if ‘the application of this Protocol leads to
serious economic, societal or environmental difficulties that are liable to persist, or to
diversion of trade.’ The UK Government argues that the Protocol has indeed led to
diversion of trade and that it has also led to serious societal difficulties, evident in the
violence that took place in Northern Ireland in April.
There are lots of question marks over the interpretation of Article 16, not least
whether any diversion of trade – something inherent in Brexit – suffices. Even if it
does, Article 16 is not a panacea as it only allows for measures that are ‘restricted
with regard to their scope and duration to what is strictly necessary in order
to remedy the situation’. Hence if there is trade diversion with regard to those
emblematic chilled sausages and other meat products, then the UK may well adopt
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safeguard measures – i.e. the decision not to enforce EU law banning the import of
chilled meats – but nothing more. Importantly, Article 16 cannot be used to suspend
all trade aspects of the Protocol.
The EU would then be entitled to adopt rebalancing measures, which would
themselves need to be strictly necessary. Whether those rebalancing measures are
confined to trade facilitated by the Protocol or could extend to trade under the TCA is
not clear.
Hence the invocation of Article 16 would predominantly be symbolic, but would not
resolve the underlying difficulties in the long term. It might appease pro-Brexit voices
in Northern Ireland and the UK more generally, but it would not help to build the
necessary trust between the EU and the UK as the EU would almost certainly launch
legal proceedings against the UK.
Three possible explanations
The big question therefore is what this Command Paper is really about. One
explanation is that it is designed for domestic consumption only, so that it can
largely be ignored. A more sinister explanation would be that it is part of a longer-
term strategy to ratchet up resistance to the Protocol amongst the population
of Northern Ireland in the hope that the 2022 elections to the Northern Ireland
Assembly might return an anti-Protocol majority. With the consent vote according
to Article 18 looming in 2024, the Northern Ireland Assembly could thus put an end
to the trade elements of the Protocol forcing the EU to re-negotiate those elements
of it. While the Article 18 route is the only way towards renegotiation accepted by
the EU, recent polling in Northern Ireland does not suggest that an anti-Protocol
majority is likely. A third explanation of the Command Paper would be more benign.
It could be understood as containing various options from which to choose, in the
hope that some of them might be acceptable to the EU. For instance, the rather
hidden suggestion that the EU and the UK should agree a ‘standstill’ on existing
arrangements – including grace periods, etc – could be seen as an attempt to take
the heat out of the Protocol negotiations. If this was the intention, one may wonder
why the UK Government continues to employ trust-eroding means of delivering
these kinds of messages to the EU.
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